CIA Analysis Of The War Of 1812 Finds Same Failures That Led To 9/11

This month is the two-hundredth day of remembrance of the British seizure of Washington , DC , and the torching of the White House . How did this cataclysm bump , despite ample word of advice ? A CIA analyst who concentrate through historical documents blames the same types of intelligence activity bankruptcy that predate Pearl Harbor and September 11th .

The British intrusion of Washington , DC , on August 24 , 1814 , was a surprise attack that should n’t have been a surprisal . The two nations were in a land of warfare ; Britain ’s defeat of Napoleon in 1814 allowed it to commit its military altogether to its campaign against the U.S. , and , most importantly , the British had land forces that were within striking aloofness of America ’s capital city . The gaining control of Washington , DC , was n’t just a defeat for the U.S. ; it was , in retrospect , an embarrassing nonstarter .

And yet , history does n’t always remember it that way . As the high historiographer John Lewis Gaddiswrotein 2005 :

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So why does n’t August 24th have a place in our memories similar to December 7th . . . or now September 11th ? It ’s partly , I intend , because the injured party on both sides were relatively light , because the attempt did n’t lead to anything bad , and because it was quickly overshadowed by Andrew Jackson ’s critical licking of the British at the Battle of New Orleans in former 1815 . Yet another reasonableness is that the invasion came at the ending of the war , not at its beginning : peace negotiation had been underway for several month , and on Christmas Eve 1814 , they acquire the Treaty of Ghent , which acknowledged victory for neither side but simply restored the status quo .

But Gaddis ’ diachronic comparisons raise an challenging dubiousness : Did word failure , such as those preceding Pearl Harbor and the September 11th terrorist attack , contribute to the U.S. unsuccessful person in 1814 to anticipate and prepare for the British onrush ?

Barriers to Perception

CIA analyst William Weber address this very question ina studypublished in the most late issue of Studies In Intelligence . Although this is the internal journal of the CIA , a few article from each edition are unclassified and made available to the world .

Weber ’s study is sort of an historic rendering of the “ 9/11 Commission Report , ” which pointedly faulted U.S. officials for a “ failure of imagination ” that kept them from reason and forestall the al Qaeda threat . In fact , when looking at what materialise in 1814 , Weber cites the four key mistakes that the intelligence agency community collectively refers to as “ barrier to Perception ” :

effectual use of abnegation ( secrecy , security , stealth ) and deception by an improvising , adaptative foe ;

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Mirror mental imagery , fraudulent intellectual histrion assumptions ;

underrating of actor ’s allegiance , hazard tolerance , or bias toward activity ;

Failure of imagination .

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Weber notes that such “ barriers ” were apparent before the Pearl Harbor and September 11 attack :

In the character of Pearl Harbor , Navy and Army commander in Washington post out on 27 November separate alerts to all US commanders in the Pacific , but this did not prompt those at Pearl Harbor to put their military unit on high alarum and grade active patrolling .

likewise , three week before the 9/11 attacks , an article in the President ’s Daily Brief , “ Bin Laden Determined to chance on in US , ” provide a general warning but lack specific on the time , home , and methods of attack .

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The U.S. failure in 1814 were even more egregious , Weber argues , since President James Madison , unlike his successor in 1941 and 2001 , was cognisant of both the sizing and way of the enemy force approaching the U.S.

The British , however , establish themselves skillful at erecting Barriers to Perception , which , in turn , led to sham U.S. assumptions concerning British intention that led to one error after another … .a cascading failure of imagery .

The British Are Coming?

Weber report the British strategy of misdirection during their initial assault on U.S. grunge :

British Rear Admiral George Cockburn designed an elaborate dissembling to mask the British onset by landing sou'-east of the working capital at Benedict from where Annapolis , Baltimore , and Washington were only a few days ’ march away . He also ordered one squadron in the Patuxent to conduct the usual maraud on farm and resolution while keeping Commodore Joshua Barney ’s flotilla bottled up . These U.S. gunboat had harassed British warships in the Chesapeake Bay before being impel to retrograde up the Patuxent originally that summertime

The British also planned two trading operations disguising their invasion ’s ultimate object . A squadron led by Captain James Gordon would create a deflection up the Potomac , attacking any fortification along the river and peril Alexandria , Virginia , and Washington from the south . A 2d feint up the Chesapeake Bay under Captain Peter Parker hoped to draw troops away from Washington by conducting raids and threatening to interrupt communications between Baltimore and Philadelphia .

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These actions successfully confused the perceptions and thinking of U.S. official . Francis Scott Key , who serve in the DC reserves , indite a reassuring note of hand to his mother say her the British “ have now gone down the river — and nobody seems to think there is any chance of their coming back again , at least , while the [ U.S. ] flock are in the neighbourhood . ”

In fact , even as the U.S. Secretary of the Navy warn that the British might border on Washington , DC , his view were dismiss by other members of Madison ’s administration .

Secretary of War Armstrong , however , doubted an attack on Washington would take place . “ Why the demon would they come here ? ” he declared , pointing to Baltimore as a more moneymaking target . key , meanwhile , mused that the British would demonstrate to capture Annapolis , whose harbor would do as a basis for attack Baltimore or Washington . He also insist that the British army had “ no object ” other than Barney ’s flotilla , and in the un- likely consequence they moved on Washing- ton , the invading force-out was so weak it would accomplish nothing more than “ a bare Cossack hooray . ”

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British move after land subsequently clouded US perceptions of their intention . The initial march from Benedict via Nottingham and Upper Marlboro to Pigs Point gave the Americans reasonableness to desire that the British aim was only to destroy Barney ’s gunboats . … .Maj . Gen. Robert Ross feinted south toward the span foil the lower Potomac — keep launch the Americans from discerning his true aim — before vacate management toward Bladensburg … .

As British force play approach , the U.S. assembled a reserves that outnumber the invading army . But , here too , misjudgment came into play . The Secretary of the Navy promise victory based upon the ranking U.S. numbers : “ Our force is fast conglomerate and we shall now retard and ultimately repulse if not destroy the force of the foe whose identification number are various judge but I conceive does not exceed at most 5,000 . ” The Secretary of War , however , on the very daytime of the fight , had doubts that a militia , despite its numbers , would be a match for a professional military .

He was correct . The British infantry attacked , endure byCongreve rocketswhich , while inaccurate , terrorise the reserves . The U.S. force was ordered to pull back , without a shot being fired .

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Dolly Madison ’s letter to her babe on August 22 , 1814 indicates how quickly the U.S. view of the British threat had evolve into a worst - case scenario :

Dear Sister ,

My husband left me yesterday dayspring to join General Winder . . . I have since obtain two dispatches from him , write with a pencil . The last is alarming , because he desire that I should be quick at a second ’s warning to enter my equipage , and go forth the metropolis ; that the enemy seemed hard than had at first been report , and it might happen that they would reach the city with the design of demolish it .

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Could’ve, Should’ve, Would’ve

Could account have locomote other than ? Weber argues that there were several opportunities to assess the situation and prepare for the regretful - case scenario . Although the British hid their dependable intentions , U.S. officials had made a classic mistake by attempting to exactly predict their opponent ’s object lens . In doing so , the U.S. brush off the more of import issue : How the capabilities of their antagonist could enable them to go after multiple , possible objectives .

As Weber annotation :

The British force at Benedict was large enough to go for several Day , and possibly calendar week , against a range of targets , including Commodore Barney ’s gunboat flotilla , nearby towns , and maybe Annapolis , Baltimore , or Washington . Attacks on any of these object would be reproducible with London ’s strategy of drawing U.S. forces away from Canada and conducting punitive raids to countermine public musical accompaniment for the war .

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